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Elena V. McLean, State University of New York at BuffaloCan economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state
sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that
governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts and cannot perfectly determine the
type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with the proposed strategy of
punishing sponsors while cooperating with hosts, creates incentives for sponsors to misrepresent themselves as host
states while continuing their support for terrorists. We demonstrate that in this environment of uncertainty, gov-
ernments rely on information regarding the state capacity of supporting states to deduce their relationship with ter-
rorists. Consequently, governments are more likely to impose sanctions against foreign states with intermediate levels
of state capacity but are less likely to impose sanctions against failing or stronger states.After 9/11, Gary Hufbauer, a prominent sanctions re-searcher, declared that sanctions could play an effec-tive supporting role in the “war on terror” (Hufbauer
2001). Sanctions could be used as both a carrot, in that the
United States could offer to remove sanctions on regimes in
exchange for their cooperation, and a stick, where the United
States could impose sanctions to punish state sponsors. How-
ever, according to the recently updated Threat and Imposi-
tion of Sanctions (TIES) data, senders threatened to impose
sanctions on hosts of transnational terrorists in only 25 cases
in the period 1945–2005 and imposed sanctions 15 times.1
Just four of the 15 cases yielded a positive outcome, and each
of these cases involved a threat or use of military force in
addition to the imposition of sanctions. These patterns raise
the question: Can economic sanctions ever be effective tools
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host states and can therefore punish sponsors using sanc-
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such as Libya’s support for Abu Nidal or Somalia’s hosting
of al Shabaab, the relationship between the supporting state
and the group is easy to determine. However, governments
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country denied its support for the terrorist group, recent
information, including some of the unauthorized infor-du) is at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 304 Hamilton Hall
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Carretera Mexico-Toluca
en@lincoln.ac.uk) is at the University of Lincoln, Baryford Pool, Lincoln
Buffalo, 520 Park Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260.
t SES 0921264. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the
arvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary materia
tm (accessed September 25, 2015).
015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/683257
3816/2016/7801-0017$10.00 249
1.023.082 on August 23, 2017 04:09:42 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).,
l
250 / Sanctions and Terrorism Navin A. Bapat et al.mation reported by Wikileaks, indicates that the govern-
ment took steps beyond simply turning a blind eye to al
Qaeda’s activities. In particular, Pakistan appears to have
frequently informed al Qaeda operatives about pending US
drone strikes and intelligence collection efforts, thereby al-
lowing al Qaeda to survive American counterterrorist ef-
forts. Furthermore, intelligence reports indicate that the
Pakistani ISI had considerably more power over terrorist
operations in its border areas than it let on: the ISI directly
assisted in smuggling operatives across the Afghan border
and sheltering them, and chose not to arrest al Qaeda and
Haqqani operatives in the border region. Taken together,
this information paints a picture of a Pakistani state that
could control where al Qaeda could operate and the group’s
use of terrorist violence in Afghanistan. Therefore, contrary
to Pakistan’s assurances that it was fighting to curb al Qaeda’s
terrorism, there is now evidence of direct involvement and
support.
Using a game theoretic model, we capture these two
possible types of relationships and argue that this uncer-
tainty encourages true state sponsors to misrepresent them-
selves as host states. In response to the uncertainty, gov-
ernments evaluate the state capacity of supporting states to
determine the nature of their relationship with terrorists.
We demonstrate that governments are unlikely to impose
sanctions against foreign supporters with weak state ca-
pacity, given that such supporters are unlikely to have suf-
ficient resources to sponsor terrorists and are therefore
likely to be hosts. Governments are also unlikely to impose
sanctions against foreign supporters with high state ca-
pacity. Although these states are more likely to be sponsors
than hosts, high-capacity states also tend to be more valu-
able economic partners, thereby making sanction costs pro-
hibitive. However, while governments do not sanction states
with weak state capacity and cannot sanction states with high
state capacity, governments may sanction foreign support-
ers with intermediate levels of state capacity. These types of
foreign supporters (such as Syria and Pakistan) maintain
enough capacity to effectively sponsor terrorists, but not so
much that they can be identified as obvious sponsors. Since
these foreign supporters may be sponsors masquerading as
hosts and since the costs of sanctioning these states are not
excessive, governments are more likely to impose sanctions
against intermediate-capacity states. We conclude by testing
this hypothesis using the TIES data along with the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD).22. The GTD, sponsored by the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is available at http://www.start
.umd.edu/gtd (accessed July 16, 2015).
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ON FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
A sanction is defined as an action one or more states take to
limit their economic relations with a target state in an effort
to persuade the target to change one or more of its policies
(Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009).
Theoretically, free economic exchanges produce a surplus
in goods and services, which the countries involved in the
trading relationship then distribute between them. However,
the use of sanctions and the resulting market imperfections
diminish this surplus by impeding the free exchange between
individuals and firms within the sender and target countries
(DeGennaro 2005; Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993). Although
the gains from trade benefit both the sender and the target,
the sender may threaten to undermine the economic rela-
tionship to extract policy concessions (Drezner 2003; Wagner
1988). Sanctions disputes are therefore often conceptualized
as a bargaining problem: the imposition of sanctions is as-
sumed to be ex post inefficient, meaning that since sanctions
reduce the gains from trade, both the sender and the target
should prefer some agreement prior to their imposition.
Early sanctions studies based on the Hufbauer et al.
(2007) data set initially found that these instruments were
ineffective and provided little in terms of extracting policy
concessions (Drury 1998; Morgan and Schwebach 1997;
Pape 1997). Recent theoretical and empirical work, how-
ever, points out that these studies suffered from selection
bias because they examined only cases in which sanctions
were actually imposed (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004;
Morgan and Miers 1999; Nooruddin 2002; Smith 1995). An
important conclusion was that if target states refused to
acquiesce to sanctions, they had likely already made a cost/
benefit calculation and decided that they preferred suffering
sanctions to changing their policies following imposition.3
The implication of these studies was that sanctions could
prove to be more effective if analysts examined sanction
threats in addition to impositions. A significant number of
studies now demonstrate that the probability of sanction
success improves if sanctions are relatively costly to the tar-
get and if the sanctions effort is multilateral or institution-
alized (Allen 2005; Bapat and Morgan 2009; McLean and
Whang 2010). These findings further indicate that sanction
threats are more effective if they are issued through inter-
national institutions, aim at democratic targets, and promise
to suspend a significant volume of trade (Bapat et al. 2013).3. Also, note that low instrumental effectiveness does not mean that
sanctions cannot impose severe economic costs on the target country.
Some estimates indicate that target costs can reach double digits as a share
of the target’s GNP (Hufbauer et al. 2007, 105).
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sanctions’ utility in assisting governments to combat trans-
national terrorism. During the Cold War, governments im-
posed sanctions against other states that were accused of
actively sponsoring terrorism by providing terrorist organi-
zations with materials, intelligence, weapons, and fighters
(Bapat 2012; Byman 2005a; Carter 2015; Conrad 2011). To
deal with this problem, according to existing research, gov-
ernments used the threat of military force to compel spon-
sors into disarming their terrorists. In practice, however, mil-
itary strikes against terrorist targets within sanctuary states
are often unsuccessful and typically result in larger, more
expanded wars. Since this option is also quite costly, gov-
ernments facing problems of transnational terrorism might
consider substituting military force with alternatives—one of
which is sanctions. Sanctions could directly harm the spon-
sor’s economy, which in turn could compel it to abandon its
support for terrorism.
However, after the end of the Cold War, transnational
terrorists increasingly conducted operations without spon-
sorship using the territories of host states (Byman 2005a,
2005b; Byman et al. 2001; Carter 2015). Unlike sponsors
that directly aided terrorist groups, host governments are
often unstable or lack the capacity to control their popu-
lations (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003;
Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In these cases, terrorists operate
from an area in the host state but are autonomous from the
host government, and hence analysts concluded that ag-
gressive tactics such as military strikes or economic sanctions
could produce adverse consequences. Specifically, Marinov
(2005) and McGillivray and Stam (2004) show that sanctions
can increase the probability of leadership turnover within
target states. The research on political transitions indicates
that abrupt leadership changes combined with increased eco-
nomic problems often produce political instability, thereby
strengthening the very terrorists the sender seeks to disarm
(Aksoy and Carter 2012; Fearon 2004). Sanctions in partic-
ular could weaken the foundations of the host’s economy,
which in turn might exacerbate political instability and in-
crease the popularity of antigovernment actors, including
terrorist groups (Enders and Hoover 2012; Weinstein 2007).
Harming the host’s economy with sanctions may therefore
produce a backlash that could lead to the rise of an oppo-
sition party that is sympathetic to terrorists’ agenda or allow
the group itself to seize power.
Given that punitive measures against host states appear
self-defeating, policy analysts warned against any action that
might jeopardize the target’s counterterrorism efforts (Carter
2015; Schultz 2010). Instead, governments should prefer
strengthening the host’s capacity to enable it to disarm the
terrorists on its own. To do so, governments could increaseThis content downloaded from 129.01
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the host’s access to capital and resources, which could be
accomplished by expanding international trade and invest-
ment. Theoretically, governments’ decision to increase eco-
nomic ties with a host should produce more efficient mar-
kets, which in turn could indirectly allow the host to gain
greater resources to fight terrorism (Li and Schaub 2004).
This cooperation should make both sides better off, since
both enjoy the benefits of increased economic exchanges
and improved counterterrorism cooperation.
We therefore see that the optimal policy for govern-
ments facing transnational terrorist groups is to punish
state sponsors with sanctions while expanding economic
ties with host states. However, this strategy assumes that gov-
ernments can perfectly distinguish between the two types of
states. Recent studies, however, indicate that drawing this
distinction is often quite difficult because of efforts by state
sponsors to mask their support of terrorist groups. To il-
lustrate, consider the case of Pakistani cooperation with the
United States in the “war on terror.” The United States is-
sued a threat following the 9/11 attacks: Pakistan could co-
operate with the United States in exchange for significant
economic and military ties, or it would face isolation and
the American military. Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf
pledged to cooperate with American efforts against the Ta-
liban and al Qaeda. The United States used bases within
Pakistan to punish the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Pa-
kistani military began to attack Taliban strongholds directly.
Despite these initial successes, the Taliban regrouped in 2004
and began staging attacks from Pakistan’s Federally Admin-
istrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Analysts offered two expla-
nations for the Taliban’s resurgence. One possibility was
that Pakistan’s government faced incredible strain, and the
United States needed to provide even greater support for
Musharraf ’s efforts to disarm the militants. Another pos-
sibility was that Musharraf was using a portion of US re-
sources to fund terrorist violence to achieve the goal of keep-
ing Afghanistan weak. Although recent information provides
some evidence in favor of the latter argument, the fact re-
mains that thousands of Pakistani troops were killed fight-
ing the Taliban, and Musharraf faced multiple assassination
attempts. These observations provide evidence in favor of the
former argument. This contradictory evidence illustrates that
governments operate in an environment of significant uncer-
tainty in examining the relationship between terrorists and
their home states.
This problem raises a key question: how can govern-
ments distinguish between sponsor and host states in the
environment of uncertainty? One of the key pieces of in-
formation governments use to make this determination is
the state capacity of supporting states. For example, given its
extensive Soviet support and military state, it seems unlikely1.023.082 on August 23, 2017 04:09:42 AM
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from the East German state. In an opposite case, it appears
less likely that Joseph Kabila’s government in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) is actively sponsoring Hutu
militias against Rwanda, given the DRC’s low military power
and inability to control much of its own territory. The more
likely explanation for the continued existence of Hutu mili-
tias is that the DRC simply lacks the capacity to disarm these
groups. These cases suggest that governments facing trans-
national terrorism can make inferences by examining the
supporter’s state capacity. However, these two cases are rel-
atively extreme examples, and many others are less obvious.
It is not necessarily clear how much control Pakistan, Syria,
Iran, Venezuela, and Sudan have over their territories. While
each of these countries is an alleged supporter of terrorists,
it is not obvious if this support is direct sponsorship. This
uncertainty creates a risk of making a mistake in adopting
either the punitive policy of sanctions or the cooperative pol-
icy of increasing economic assistance. These mistakes may be
quite costly, as providing economic support to a sponsor is
likely to strengthen terrorists. On the other hand, punishing
a host reduces its capacity, thereby also strengthening ter-
rorist groups. We now turn to the formal model to identify
when governments respond to this uncertainty by imposing
economic sanctions.4. Assume that the players are risk neutral.
5. Since p is a probability, p ∈ [0, 1].
6. Government G’s prior belief Ω is exogenous. Assume that Ω ∈ [0, 1]
since it is the probability that nature draws S.MODEL
Figure 1 presents a stylized model of a conflict between a
government G and a transnational terrorist group T oper-
ating from a foreign state that is either a state sponsor (S)This content downloaded from 129.01
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms or a host (H).4 The conflict between G and T is over some
general political issue, such as the level of political auton-
omy in a particular region, the number of representatives
from T ’s preferred party in the national legislature, or an
overthrow of the entire governing system. The group T
stages terrorist attacks in an effort to compel G into revis-
ing the status quo in T ’s favor. These attacks may include
bombing to sabotage parts of G’s economy, inciting riots
and mobilizing students at G’s university campuses, kidnap-
ping government officials, or intimidating the population
into supporting political changes.
Table 1 presents each of the model’s parameters and
their definitions. Let us assume that the issue in dispute is
indivisible and that T ’s violence compels G into making T ’s
desired political changes with probability p but fails to do
so with the corresponding probability 1 2 p.5 Both players
pay some cost for fighting: c(G,T) ∈ [0, 1]. If G prevents T
from accomplishing its objectives, G receives a payoff of 1
while T receives a payoff of 0. On the other hand, if T
succeeds in accomplishing its objectives, G receives a payoff
of 0, whereas T receives a payoff of 1.
Government G is uncertain if the foreign state is a spon-
sor or a host state at the start of the game. We represent G’s
prior belief that the foreign state is a sponsor (S) as Q and
G’s prior belief that the foreign state is a host (H) with the
corresponding probability 1 2 Q.6 There are two key differ-Figure 1. Transnational terrorism game1.023.082 on August 23, 2017 04:09:42 AM
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8. Formally, since b ≥ 1, it must be true that bp ≥ p. Since bp is a
probability, assume that if bp 1 1, bp p 1. We assume b ≤ 2 to avoid
cases in which sponsors can improve the power of terrorists to such an
extent that they are impossible to disarm. The ability of terrorists to
strengthen with sponsorship is likely partially endogenous to the group’s
capability without assistance. It is also quite rare for even the most pow-
erful sponsors to more than double the fighting power of terrorist or-
ganizations. These restrictions are captured by the limits on b.
Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 253ences between the two types. First, sponsors prefer outcomes
in which T succeeds in revising the status quo, whereas hosts
prefer to maintain the status quo that is in G ’s favor.7 Sec-
ond, if the terrorists operate from the host state H, T main-
tains autonomy over its decision making. Therefore, T be-
gins the game with its decision whether to attack G if nature
chooses H (1 2 Ω). On the other hand, if terrorists operate
from sponsor S, the sponsor initially maintains control over
T. Therefore, if nature selects a sponsor (Ω), S decides if the
terrorists attack G or not. Should either S or T decide to
attack, G observes that terrorist attacks took place but cannot
perfectly distinguish between state-sponsored attacks and at-
tacks by autonomous groups from hosts. The information set
indicates that G is uncertain if the foreign state is a sponsor
that is antagonistic to its interests or a host that is supportive
of its interests. Substantively, this represents a strategic sit-
uation similar to the one that the United States faced in the
early to mid-2000s in dealing with Musharraf ’s Pakistan. In
this case, the United States could not perfectly determine if
Pakistan was an ally in the war on terror or if Pakistan was
duplicitous and supported the Taliban and al Qaeda.
The model assumes that the foreign state has some abil-
ity to increase T ’s fighting capability if it is a sponsor and
some ability to undermine T ’s fighting capability if it is
a host. The foreign state’s ability to increase or undermine
T is a function of its state capacity, represented formally
by the parameter b ∈ [1, 2]. The capacity b → 1 in cases
in which the foreign supporter exhibits low state capacity
(such as Yemen), and b → 2 if the foreign supporter is
relatively wealthy and powerful (such as Saudi Arabia). This7. This indicates that uS p 1 if T prevails and uS p 0 if G wins, and
vice versa for the host H.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms indicates that relatively powerful foreign supporters are bet-
ter able to influence T ’s fighting ability than weaker ones.8
To capture the effect of sponsorship, assume that state sup-
port increases T ’s military capability from p to bp.9 For
example, both US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and
Admiral Michael Mullen charged in 2011 that Pakistani
sponsorship was improving the Haqqani network’s ability
to carry out attacks in Afghanistan. On the other hand, if
the foreign supporter is a host, it can hinder T ’s ability to
engage in its conflict against G by closing camps, policing
the border, monitoring finances, and so forth. We therefore
assume that T ’s ability to operate from a hostile host state
falls from p to p/b. For example, following the December
2001 bombings of the Indian Parliament building in New
Delhi, Musharraf vowed to crack down on all militants in
Pakistan and made numerous arrests, which likely decreased
the fighting capacity of Kashmiri terrorists operating against
India. This supports the assumption that hosts can under-
mine terrorists’ ability to accomplish their objectives if hosts
choose to cooperate, whereas sponsors can increase the
probability that terrorists will succeed by assisting the group.Table 1. Model ParametersParameter InterpretationΩ G ’s prior belief that foreign state is a sponsor (S)
1 2 Ω G ’s prior belief that T is autonomous and that foreign state is a host (H )
p Baseline probability T achieves its objectives
1 2 p Baseline probability G disarms T
c(G,T) Cost for fighting in terrorist campaign
k Cost to S for sponsoring T
b Foreign state’s capacity
φ Value of economic transactions between G and foreign stateNote. It is assumed that none of the parameters fall below a value of 0 or can exceed a value of 1, with the
exception of b ∈ [1, 2].9. Empirically, not all forms of sponsorship require extensive re-
sources. However, sponsors are better able to influence terrorist groups’
success with greater resources, which are more likely to be available to
high-capacity states. We therefore assume that the group’s ability to suc-
ceed increases to a greater extent if it is supported by a high-capacity state.
For more justification of this assumption, see Byman (2005a).
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with probability Ω or a host with probability 1 2 Ω.10 If
nature selects a sponsor, S chooses to sponsor terrorism
against G or to accept the status quo, which ends the game.
Should S sponsor terrorism and play Attack, S expends
some military resources to T as k ∈ ½k, k , which may
represent the capital needed to finance T ’s operations, the
weaponry delivered to T ’s members, or the cost of providing
intelligence and/or bases to the group.11 Lower levels of
support, such as political inspiration or intelligence sharing,
correspond to lower values of k, whereas more critical levels
of support, such as the provision of bases or fighters, corre-
spond to higher values of k.12 If nature chooses H instead
(with probability 1 2 Ω), the terrorists T choose to either
attack G or refrain from engaging in violence. If the group
chooses not to attack, the game ends with the status quo
intact. If the group instead resorts to terrorism, the game
continues.
If either S or T attacks, G observes terrorist activity ema-
nating from within the foreign state’s territory. Next G de-
cides whether to punish the foreign state by imposing sanc-
tions and severing economic transactions or to behave in a
more cooperative fashion by maintaining economic links.13
The decision to sanction is costly for both the government
G and the foreign state. Formally, S or H pays a cost φ while
G pays a cost 2bφ if sanctions are imposed, where φ∈ ½0, φ
represents the size of the economic relationship between the10. Since Ω represents the probability that nature chooses S, assume
that Ω ∈ [0, 1]. Theoretically, it is possible that this relationship is dy-
namic and that a sponsor at time t may abandon terrorists at time t 1 1,
thereby switching its type to a host. However, for simplicity, we restrict the
game to one round. This is appropriate given our substantive question,
which is whether a government imposes sanctions on the foreign state at
time t.
11. The term k is an exogenous parameter.
12. Byman (2005a) and Byman et al. (2001) discuss the variation in
the types of sponsorship.
13. This dilemma resembles the one described by Kydd and Walter
(2002), where governments attempt to determine if moderates are exerting
enough effort to control extremists in their organization from engaging in
violence. However, this model differs from Kydd and Walter’s in that the
sponsor alone determines whether the terrorists attack if nature draws this
type of foreign supporter. We adopt this setup partially to simplify the
model but also because a more complex version in which the sponsor
chooses to encourage or curb terrorist violence reduces to our current
setup. If the sponsor restrains the group, the game ends, as it does in our
version when S chooses ∼Attack. If the sponsor allows the terrorists to
attack and the group attacks, this is equivalent to S playing Attack. The
only set of cases not captured by our model occur when the sponsor allows
terrorists to attack but they refuse. These cases are less theoretically in-
teresting and are highly unusual empirically. We therefore see that aside
from these rare cases, the more complicated model reduces to our simpler
game.
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economic transactions with the foreign state, whereas values
of φ → 0 indicate that economic transactions between G
and the foreign state are relatively modest, and hence sanc-
tions are less damaging. The effects of severing the economic
transactions between G and the foreign state are multiplied
by the b parameter, which indicates that economic ex-
changes are more valuable to the government if the foreign
state has a greater capacity. Substantively, this suggests that
commerce between the two states is more lucrative if the
foreign state has an effective police force to protect property
rights and multinationals, developed infrastructure, and a
more educated workforce. On the other hand, if the foreign
state is a low-capacity state with rampant corruption, poor
roads and bridges, and a low-skill workforce, the value of
the economic relationship diminishes.15 Representing the
loss of economic transactions resulting from sanctions as
2bφ captures the difference in the value of economic ex-
changes from different types of foreign states.
In addition to imposing economic damage on both sides,
sanctions harm the ability of both sponsors and hosts to use
their resources to influence the terrorist campaign. For-
mally, assume that if sanctions are imposed, terrorists’ abil-
ity to accomplish their objectives from host states increases
from p/b to p/(b 2 1). On the other hand, if the foreign
state is a sponsor, severing economic transactions may di-
minish terrorists’ effectiveness. If sanctions are imposed on
S, T ’s probability of success decreases from bp to (b 2 1)
p.16 Sanctions therefore have different effects on T ’s ability
to operate given the type of foreign supporter. Substan-
tively, this suggests that cutting a sponsor’s oil revenues will
reduce its resources to fund terrorism; however, cutting a
host’s oil revenues will reduce its resources to monitor ter-
rorist activity and arrest suspects. Therefore, sanctions are
beneficial to senders when directed at sponsors but are
counterproductive when imposed against host states. Once
G makes its choice of whether to impose sanctions or not,
nature next determines if T succeeds in compelling G to14. Assume that φ ≤ 1. While we examined a version of the model
in which φ was the product of endogenous bargaining between G and the
foreign state, we found that substantive empirical predictions of the model
did not change if φ was endogenous, and therefore, we opted for the
simpler version of the model.
15. This assumption is based on empirical work suggesting that in-
terstate commerce is more prevalent in high-income countries vs. devel-
oping ones. See World Bank (2010).
16. We see that this is true since bp 1 (b 2 1)p simplifies to bp 1 bp 2
p, which simplifies to 0 1 2p. This is always true if p 1 0. Substantively, this
indicates that even a minor sanction can diminish state sponsors’ ability to
strengthen terrorist groups.
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Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 255alter the disputed policy or if G suppresses T and maintains
G ’s preferred status quo.
SOLUTION
The game is solved using the perfect Bayesian solution con-
cept.17 We begin by considering G’s decision. Since spon-
sors use economic transactions to fuel the terrorists, G en-
hances its counterterrorism effort by imposing sanctions
against sponsors. On the other hand, since sanctions harm
hosts’ ability to fight terrorists, governments should prefer
avoiding sanctions when facing host states. Therefore, if G
refuses to impose sanctions but the foreign state is actually
a sponsor, G undermines its own counterterrorism effort.
However, G also undermines its counterterrorism effort if it
imposes sanctions and the foreign state is a host. We there-
fore see the crux of the government’s key decision problem:
failing to impose sanctions against a sponsor harms coun-
terterrorism, but imposing sanctions against hosts also un-
dermines counterterrorism.
Government G updates its belief about the foreign state’s
type after observing terrorist attacks. The attacks represent
a strategic choice made by either the sponsor or the ter-
rorists themselves. Figure 2 presents a set of cut points iden-
tifying the foreign state’s strategic behavior as a function of
the foreign state’s capacity (b).18 At the left-hand side of
the plot where b ! k/p, governments know that weaker
sponsors have a dominant strategy to play ∼Attack. Foreign
states that are poorer with weaker militaries are less able to
strengthen terrorists significantly with sponsorship. For-
mally, if b is low, an increase from T ’s baseline fighting
power of p to bp is likely to be relatively small. Since spon-
sorship is costly (k) and weaker foreign states cannot en-
hance terrorists’ fighting power significantly, governments
know that weaker states are more likely to be hosts rather
than sponsors. Several empirical studies support the model’s
conclusion that terrorists operate with autonomy from rel-
atively weak states (Piazza 2008; Salehyan 2009). If these17. The complete formal solution is in the appendix.
18. We demonstrate that G imposes sanctions in mixed strategies
against foreign states with intermediate levels of capacity as part of a
semiseparating equilibrium (k/p ! b ! p/φ). Let Q* (formally defined in
eq. [1]) represent the belief that G is indifferent between playing Sanction
vs. ∼Sanction. The solid line maps the probability that G imposes sanctions
in mixed strategies when Q p .95. This represents cases in which Q 1 Q*
and 1.167 ≤ b ! 1.45884. In these cases, G has a very strong prior that the
foreign state is a sponsor and imposes sanctions with probability qp (bp2
k)/(φ 1 p). The dashed line represents the probability that G imposes
sanctions when Qp .45, which represents cases in which Q* ≥ Q and 1.2 ≤
b ! 1.67. In these cases, G has a weaker prior that the foreign state is a
sponsor and imposes sanctions with probability j p [(b 2 1)(bcT 2 p)]/p.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms states appear to lack the ability to control their territories, it
makes sense that they are also unlikely to have the resources
needed to strengthen terrorists. The government’s optimal
strategy is therefore to avoid imposing sanctions and to
maintain cooperation with the host.
Proposition 1. For sufficiently low-capacity foreign
states (b ! k/p), no sanctions occur and the following
strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium:19.
2, whic
1.023.0
and Co1. Sponsor: ∼Attack.
2. Terrorists: Attack.
3. Government: ∼Sanction.
4. Beliefs: Pr{QFAttack} p 0 & Pr{QF∼At-
tack} p 1.Proof. See the appendix, available online.
We see that the opposite is true in cases on the right-
hand side of figure 2, where the foreign supporter is rela-
tively strong (b 1 p/φ). Terrorists recognize that these
powerful host states will alter the balance of power in favor
of the government. If the host reduces the probability that
terrorists succeed and conducting terrorist campaigns is
costly,19 we would expect terrorists to suspend their cam-
paigns when they operate from powerful hosts. Empirically,
this means that governments should not observe autono-
mous terrorists staging attacks from stronger hosts. If a
foreign state is powerful enough to deter terrorists but the
government observes terrorism, the government will up-
date that the foreign state is a sponsor. Yet, even if theFigure 2. Probability that G imposes sanctions following observation of
terrorist violence holding: p p .3, φ p .18, cT p .25, k p .35.If b→ 2, the probability of terrorist success decreases from p to p/
h is a 50% reduction. Terrorists must pay cT if they fight.
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20. See Byman (2005a, 224–38) for an overview of this case.
21. This might explain part of the reason why Saddam Hussein re
fused to support al Qaeda. See Bapat et al. (2007) for a further discussion
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lgovernment observes terrorism, it may still avoid imposing
sanctions against high-capacity states. Although sanctions
improve the government’s counterterrorism effort, high-
capacity states are more likely to have larger markets for
exports, better technology, and deeper capital markets. The
government may therefore harm its own economy by im-
posing sanctions against such states, even if it believes that
these states are sponsoring terrorism. Therefore, if the for-
eign state’s capacity is relatively greater, governments may
refrain from imposing sanctions if the benefit of the eco-
nomic relationship outweighs the risk posed by terrorists.
To illustrate, consider the case of the United States and
Saudi Arabia throughout the 1990s. The United States sus-
pected that Saudi Arabia maintained ties to al Qaeda and
supported the group through various charitable organiza-
tions. The Saudis denied any connection with al Qaeda and
continued to profess cooperation with American counter-
terrorist efforts. However, given Saudi Arabia’s extensive
intelligence network and vast oil riches, it seemed incon-
ceivable that al Qaeda could draw on Saudi charities with-
out the knowledge of the kingdom’s leadership. Presum-
ably, since Saudi Arabia is a high-capacity state (b → 2),
the United States should have identified Saudi Arabia as
a sponsor and imposed sanctions. However, if the United
States did impose sanctions, the economic damage resulting
from this action would have been significant. One scenario
might have been an increase in the price of gasoline for
American consumers, while another scenario may have in-
volved the Saudis slowing the purchase of American trea-
suries, leading to a spike in US interest rates. Given these
potential consequences, the United States chose to continue
fighting al Qaeda without imposing sanctions, despite the
strong possibility that the Saudis were enhancing al Qaeda’s
military power through private channels.20 The potential
damage from sanctions simply outweighed the cost of fight-
ing a state-sponsored al Qaeda in this case. Formally, gov-
ernments will avoid imposing sanctions if b 1 p/φ, indicat-
ing that high-capacity states are less likely to face sanctions.
Proposition 2. For sufficiently high-capacity foreign
states (b 1 p/φ), no sanctions occur and the following
strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium:1. Sponsor: Attack.
2. Terrorists: ∼Attack.
3. Government: ∼Sanction.
4. Beliefs: Pr{QFAttack} p 1 & Pr{QF∼At-
tack} p 0.Proof. See the appendix.
Taken together, these results indicate that we are em-
pirically unlikely to observe sanctions against weaker for-
eign states and against very powerful foreign states. This
leaves us with foreign states with intermediate levels of state
capacity (k/p ! b ! p/φ). In these cases, governments wil
face a more difficult challenge in determining the type of
foreign supporter they are facing. The foreign state’s ca-
pacity is high enough that sponsoring a terrorist group is
possible but is too low to determine conclusively that ter-
rorists would not operate without sponsorship. To illustrate
consider that the Pakistani government is strong enough to
bolster the Taliban’s operations but does not appear domi-
nant in the FATA, leaving open the possibility that the Ta-
liban could operate without sponsorship. This intermediate
level of state capacity therefore creates considerable difficulty
in assessing the relationship between the foreign state and its
terrorists.
Since the government cannot determine the foreign
state’s type in the intermediate range and the government
prefers to sanction sponsors while cooperating with hosts
there is an incentive for sponsors to misrepresent themselves
as hosts. We therefore see a strategic logic for why foreign
states with intermediate levels of state capacity sponsor ter-
rorism covertly and seek plausible deniability. If a sponsor
were to support terrorism openly, it would invite a punitive
response (such as sanctions) that may undermine terrorists
ability to accomplish their objectives. However, if govern-
ments believe that a true sponsor is actually a host, the spon-
sor could use the gains from continuing its economic trans-
actions with the government to fuel greater terrorism and
improve the group’s probability of success. Interestingly, this
suggests that most effective sponsors of terrorism are those
states that cannot be definitively classified as sponsors.21
The case of US relations with Pakistan illustrates this
logic. On the surface, the Pakistani government appeared
cooperative with the US efforts to disarm the Taliban and a
Qaeda. The United States therefore supplied Pakistan with
billions in economic and military aid. We may never know
what exactly Pakistan did with this aid since it is impossible
to know if the governments of Musharraf or Zardari were
truly hosts or sponsors. However, we do see logically that
if Pakistan sponsored the Taliban, keeping this behavior
secret would have been incredibly beneficial. Pakistan could
transfer a portion of the flow of economic and military
goods to the Taliban, which in turn would improve their
ability to fight the Americans. However, if the United States-
.
22. In part 1,
mp ½(p1b2φ(b2 1))(Q2 1)=½(b2 1)(bφ2 p)bQ.
In part 3, q p (bp 2 k)/(φ 1 p).
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,came to believe that Pakistan was sponsoring the Taliban, it
would impose sanctions and cut off the flow of economic
resources, which in turn would make the task of supporting
terrorists more difficult. Pakistan therefore had a strategic
incentive to continue denying its cooperation with both the
Taliban and al Qaeda, a claim that became dubious once
bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound was discovered less than
a mile from a prestigious Pakistani military academy.
Let us consider the players’ behavior if the foreign state
is in the intermediate range of state capacity. Since G can-
not determine the foreign state’s type using b, it chooses its
strategy on the basis of its posterior beliefs. Government G
is indifferent between cooperating with the foreign state
and imposing sanctions if G ’s belief that the foreign state is
a sponsor is equal to
Qp ½ p1 (b2 1)b2φ=½ p(12 b1b2). (1)
Although G is uncertain about the foreign state’s type, G
updates G ’s beliefs by observing if terrorist attacks materi-
alize. It imposes sanctions if Ω0 1 Ω* and does not sanction
if Ω0 ≤ Ω*.
In the first case, where the government has a stronger
prior that the foreign state is a sponsor (Ω 1 Ω*), the gov-
ernment’s pure strategy is to sanction, which deters spon-
sors from supporting terrorists. If the terrorists operate
from a host state, the sanctions would encourage the ter-
rorists to continue their violence. However, since the gov-
ernment recognizes that sponsors should not attack if Ω 1
Ω*, governments will update that the terrorists are oper-
ating autonomously from host states. The bombing of the
Indian Parliament building in New Delhi illustrates this
case. Much of the Indian Parliament presumed that Paki-
stan sponsored the attacks on the basis of its history of
supporting Kashmiri militants and Musharraf ’s ties with
the ISI. Yet, if Musharraf knew that India would blame him
for the attacks, why would he sponsor them? The alterna-
tive argument, outlined by the Pakistanis, was that the mil-
itants operated autonomously and attempted to aggravate
tensions between the rivals. Indian Prime Minister Atul Vaj-
payee appeared to accept this explanation following Mu-
sharraf ’s promise to rein in these groups, and tensions eased
into the following year. However, if Musharraf was misrep-
resenting himself as a host when he was actually a sponsor,
Vajpayee’s refusal to impose sanctions increased the power
of the Pakistani-supported terrorist groups operating against
India. We therefore see that while imposing sanctions in
response to terrorist violence encourages attacks from host
states, an outright refusal to impose sanctions encourages
state-sponsored attacks. This indicates that there is no pure
strategy for this set of cases. Instead, the solution is char-acterized by a semiseparating strategy in which the govern-
ment imposes sanctions with some positive probability, rep-
resented by the solid line in the intermediate range of b in
figure 2.
Proposition 3. For intermediate-capacity foreign
states (k/p ≤ b ≤ p/φ), sanctions occur with some
positive probability. If Q 1 Q*, the following strategies
and beliefs constitute a semiseparating perfect Bayes-
ian equilibrium:221. Sponsor: Attack with probability m and ∼At-
tack with probability 1 2 m.
2. Terrorists: Attack.
3. Government: Sanction with probability q and
∼Sanction with probability 1 2 q.
4. Beliefs: Pr{QFAttack} p Q* & Pr{QF∼At-
tack} p 1.Proof. See the appendix.
On the other hand, if the government’s prior that the
foreign state is a sponsor is weaker (Ω ≤ Ω*), G should
refuse to impose sanctions in response to terrorist attacks
This should deter autonomous terrorists from attacking but
also encourages state-sponsored groups to attack. There-
fore, if the government observes terrorist violence, it may
infer that the terrorists receive state sponsorship. The gov-
ernment will then switch its strategy and impose sanctions
India and Pakistan again provide an example of this case
relations between the two countries appeared to thaw fol-
lowing the crisis of late 2001. The Indian government be-
lieved that Pakistan was honoring its commitment to crack
down on Kashmiri terrorists. However, in December 2008
LeT terrorists engaged in two spectacular attacks against
two hotels in Mumbai. The Pakistani government again
denied complicity and claimed that various “nonstate ac-
tors” attempted to foment another crisis. However, in con-
trast to 2001, India was unwilling to accept Pakistan’s ex-
planation. Since 2002, India and Pakistan were pursuing
what was known as the “composite dialogue,” which rep-
resented final negotiations over territorial disputes and ef-
forts to bolster trade. The two sides opened lines of trans-
portation between their territories and initiated efforts to
bolster economic cooperation. Following the attacks, India
suspended the negotiations over the composite dialogue
23. In part 2,
jp ½bQ(b2 1)(bφ2 p)=½(p1b2φ(b2 1))(211Q).
In part 3, j p [(b 2 1)(bcT 2 p)]/p.
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lthereby ceasing the growth in Indo-Pakistani economic ties.
India claimed that it was unable to continue good-faith ne-
gotiations with Pakistan given the Mumbai events. As a re-
sult, trade and investment between the two states fell pre-
cipitously in the following year.
Although India was initially willing to give Pakistan the
benefit of the doubt, the government updated its beliefs
after observing the Mumbai attacks and conducting a sub-
sequent investigation. India soon accused Pakistan of some
complicity in the attacks and suspended economic coop-
eration. However, if Pakistani officials were telling the truth
and the terrorists did indeed operate independently, India’s
suspension of the composite dialogue inadvertently strength-
ened the LeT. On the other hand, if the attacks were Pa-
kistani inspired and India did nothing, the refusal to impose
sanctions would encourage greater state sponsorship. We
therefore see that the solution is again characterized by a
semiseparating strategy in which the government imposes
sanctions with some positive probability, represented by the
dashed line in the intermediate range of b in figure 2.
Proposition 4a. For intermediate-capacity foreign
states (k/p ! b ! p/cT), no sanctions occur and the
following strategies and beliefs constitute a pooling
perfect Bayesian equilibrium:1. Sponsor: Attack.
2. Terrorists: Attack.
3. Government: ∼Sanction.
4. Beliefs: Pr{QFAttack} p Q.Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4b. For intermediate-capacity foreign
states (p/cT ! b ! p/φ), sanctions occur with some
positive probability. If Q ≤ Q*, the following strategies
and beliefs constitute a semiseparating perfect Bayes-
ian equilibrium:231. Sponsor: Attack.
2. Terrorists: Attack with probability j and ∼At-
tack with probability 1 2 j.
3. Government: Sanction with probability j and
∼Sanction with probability 1 2 j.
4. Beliefs: Pr{QFAttack} p Q* & Pr{QF∼At-
tack} p Q.Proof. See the appendix.
Table 2 outlines the government’s equilibrium behavior
and presents our empirical expectations. The model pre-
dicts that governments are unlikely to sanction if the for-
eign state’s capacity is low, given that these states are un-
likely to be sponsors. Similarly, governments are unlikely to
sanction foreign states with high capacity, either because
these states are deterred from sponsorship or because the
economic relationship is too valuable to sever. In the in-
termediate range, where G adopts a mixed strategy, there is
some positive probability that the government will respond
to terrorist violence by imposing sanctions. This probability
increases as the foreign state’s capacity increases from weak
to moderate but drops off once the foreign state becomes
too powerful. Interestingly, the model predicts that there is
a low overall likelihood of the imposition of sanctions but
that it does maximize against states with intermediate state
capacity. These states are strong enough to be able to in-
fluence the outcome of the terrorist campaign but are not
so strong that severing the economic relationship would
cause significant damage to the sanctioning government.
H1. Governments are more likely to respond to trans-
national terrorist campaigns with sanctions if the for-
eign state exhibits a moderate level of state capacity.
From the model, we gain several insights into how eco-
nomic sanctions affect transnational terrorist campaigns
First, we see that sanctions are unlikely to be imposed
against weaker states. These states do not have the power
to strengthen terrorists through sponsorship. Additionally
sanctions will effectively make weak states even weaker and
produce conditions that are more favorable to transnationa
terrorists. We therefore see that the foreign state’s capacity
provides information about its type to governments facingTable 2. Empirical Expectations as a Function of the Foreign State’s Capacity (b)Foreign State Capacity Empirical ExpectationWeak G does not impose sanctions
Moderate G imposes sanctions with some positive probability in mixed strategies
Strong G does not impose sanctions
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,transnational terrorism. On the other hand, foreign states
that are very powerful are also likely to avoid sanctions. The
economic ties to these states are so valuable that govern-
ments will risk conflicts with state-sponsored terrorists over
severing lucrative economic transactions. This may explain
why countries such as the United States and the former
USSR, both of which actively sponsored terrorist groups,
never faced sanctions from any of their targets.
The more interesting cases are the foreign supporters
with intermediate levels of capacity. Here, because the for-
eign state is powerful enough to be able to sponsor ter-
rorism but not powerful enough to control the group fully,
there is uncertainty about its type. The model indicates that
in many cases, sponsors mimic the behavior of hosts, sug-
gesting that these moderately powerful states have the
strongest incentive to sponsor terrorism. On the other hand,
because sponsorship can provoke sanctions, terrorists also
have incentives to provoke governments into imposing sanc-
tions to further their objectives. This echoes the argument
made by the Pakistanis following the Mumbai attacks, when
they stated that terrorists sought to create conflict between
India and Pakistan. The model suggests that we cannot em-
pirically identify what the “true” relationship between a for-
eign state and terrorists is in this intermediate category. How-
ever, governments are more likely to use sanctions when
facing foreign states that exhibit moderate levels of state
capacity.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A test of hypothesis 1 requires data on a sender government
that has enough economic power to impose meaningful
sanctions and is targeted by one or more transnational ter-
rorist groups in several foreign states. Theoretically, any
state could serve as a sender and impose sanctions against
targets suspected of colluding with terrorists. For example,
throughout the 1970s, the government of Rhodesia im-
posed sanctions against Zambia to compel President Ken-
neth Kaunda into revoking his support for the Zimbabwe
African National Union. Although these types of sanctions
are rare according to the TIES data set, we do see that the
United States is identified as the primary sender in 20 out
of 31 cases of sanctions imposed to “terminate support for
non-state actors” and/or “deter or punish drug trafficking
practices” (64.5%). Interestingly, TIES also identifies the
United States as a sender in almost half of the sanctions
episodes from 1945 to 2005. In sum, the United States is
the most frequent sender of sanctions, is one of the few
states to use this tactic in combating transnational terrorists,
and accounts for a large enough portion of international
economic activity to be able to damage sanctioned states’
economies. We therefore limit the analysis to cases in whichthe United States serves as a sender. We identify transna-
tional terrorist challenges to the United States by focusing on
attacks against US interests abroad or transnational attacks
within US soil. This definition excludes domestic terrorists
such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panthers.
The next step is to determine which countries are con-
sidered potential target states for American sanctions. We
identify targets as any state where terrorist attacks against
US interests took place using the Global Terrorism Data-
base (GTD2). After locating the set of transnational attacks
in the GTD where the United States was an attack target
from 1970 to 2005 (4,729 incidents), we dropped 690 cases
in which the perpetrating group was unknown, was unclear
or was a domestic group within the United States. This list
of potential targets was next merged with TIES data to
create a dyadic data set consisting of the United States and
each potential target in the period 1970–2005. Since US
efforts against transnational terrorists focus primarily on
the developing world, we dropped the Group of 8 countries
the set of NATO allies, and other major powers as potentia
target states. The final data set consists of 85 target states
and 3,725 dyad years from 1970 to 2005.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is whether or not the United States
imposes sanctions against one of the target states in the
sample in a given year. In coding this variable, the first ques-
tion is what types of sanctions to focus on. As the mode
suggests, states can rarely craft sanctions for the specific pur-
pose of punishing state sponsors, because the latter have the
incentive to misrepresent. However, it is possible for the
United States to use other types of sanctions to punish coun-
tries with potential terrorist ties. For example, in the mid-
1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against Syria
in response to its drug-trafficking practices, despite the fact
that Syria has rarely been mentioned as a critical state in the
international drug trade. In total, we identify 164 imposi-
tions against target states in this period, representing 4.6%
of the observations.
Explanatory variables
Hypothesis 1 states that the sender should be more likely to
impose sanctions against targets with intermediate levels of
capacity compared to targets that exhibit very low or high
levels of capacity. We capture this curvilinear relationship
by squaring several measures of state capacity from the cur-
rent literature. First, we use the target state’s per capita GDP
score, expressed in thousands of constant 2005 US dollars
from the World Development Indicators. Since this mea-
sure is often criticized (Hendrix 2010), we also include two
indicators drawn from the relative political reach (RPR) index
25. Recall that our theoretical results suggest that the nonsquared
measure of government capacity should have a positive coefficient because
foreign states are more likely to be punished by sanctions as their capacity
260 / Sanctions and Terrorism Navin A. Bapat et al.(Kugler and Tamen 2012).24 This index seeks to capture
the capacity of the state to mobilize its own population
by weighing factors such as the share of educated population,
the share of social security taxes over GDP, and the unem-
ployment rate. Effective governments are able to mobilize re-
sources necessary for implementation of their policy agenda,
while ineffective governments fail. Therefore, the political reach
index incorporates a range of social and economic measures
that reflect the degree to which the government is present
in citizens’ regular activities. Each capacity variable with its
squared term is included in a separate model.
We also include several control variables in the statistical
models. First, we use UN voting affinity data to control for
the similarity of foreign policy preferences (Strezhnev and
Voeten 2013). For every country selected into the sample,
we include s-scores between this country and the United
States in a given year. Second, we include a measure of trade
interdependence between the United States and the target
state using the share of US exports to each country divided
by US GDP and US imports from each country as a share
of US GDP (Barbieri and Keshk 2012). We further control
for the target’s regime type by including the target state’s
polity score and a dummy variable indicating if the coun-
try transitioned from democracy to autocracy (Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland 2010). We also use Correlates of War data
on intrastate wars to control for the existence of a domestic
conflict in the country where the US interests were attacked
(Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Finally, we include a measure
of the target’s population size from the World Development
Indicators to capture the target’s internal heterogeneity.
Finally, we control for the number of attacks against US
interests in each country in the sample. If sanctions simply
follow terrorist attacks, we should expect that the more at-
tacks the United States experiences in a country, the higher
the probability of US sanctions will be. However, if our
argument is correct, sanctions should not depend on the
number of attacks. To test this implication of the model, we
construct a count variable for the number of yearly attacks
against US interests in a given country.24. The political reach measures are constructed on the basis of
estimates from two models: for the first measure (RPRw), the dependent
variable is the ratio of activity rate to population; for the second (RPRe),
the dependent variable is the ratio of economically active population to
population. The key regressors in these models are education, young pop-
ulation, social security, urbanization, population, GDP per capita, bu-
reaucracy, and, in the second model only, unemployment. For more in-
formation on these measures and the data, see Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al.
(2013). Our results also hold if we use targets’ Composite Index of Na-
tional Capacity scores.
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Given that we use a pooled cross-sectional time-series data
set with a binary dependent variable, we test the hypothesis
using a logit model with standard errors clustered on the
target states. We control for temporal dependence using the
cubic polynomial approach suggested by Carter and Sig-
norino (2010): we include a count variable for years with-
out attacks (t), t 2 and t3 in all specifications. Our expecta-
tion is that the coefficient on the state capacity measure will
be positive, whereas the coefficient on the squared state
capacity term will be negative. This captures our prediction
that the probability of sanctions maximizes in the inter-
mediate range of capacity but subsequently falls as state
capacity becomes very large.RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results from the statistical tests. Each
of the measures for state capacity along with their squared
terms are significant and in the anticipated directions in
each of the four models.25 The observation that each of the
variables capturing state capacity leads to a similar statis-
tical relationship strengthens the general support for hy-
pothesis 1. Interestingly, the number of attacks against US
interests in potential target countries does not have a sta-
tistically significant effect on the likelihood of sanctions in
any of the models. This supports our expectation that when
the United States faces challenges from transnational ter-
rorists, its response depends on the strength of the foreign
state rather than on the harm caused to US interests.26
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the curvilinear relationship
between sanction imposition and state capacity. The first
panel of figure 3 is based on model 1 of table 3 and graphs
the predicted effect of a country’s per capita GDP on the
probability of US sanction imposition when a terrorist at-grows from low to moderate levels, as sponsorship becomes more likely.
The squared term, on the other hand, should have a negative coefficient
because for high capacity levels, the effect of foreign states’ capacity on
sanction imposition should lessen and then reverse. In more technical
terms, our expectation of a nonmonotonic relationship indicates that the
coefficient on the squared term should be negative. The nonsquared term,
then, should have a positive coefficient to capture the nonmonotonicity
because this term determines whether the maximum occurs for capacity
values less than or greater than zero, and our capacity measures take only
positive values.
26. We used other approaches to accounting for caused harm (e.g., we
restricted the sample to attack locations where US citizens were killed),
and the results remained largely unchanged.
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Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 261tack against US interests has taken place in the country.
Both panels of figure 4 show the same effect, but using
relative political capacity variables (RPRw and RPRe) in-
stead of GDP per capita as measures of state capacity. Fi-
nally, the second panel of figure 3 also shows a nonmono-
tonic relationship between logged GDP per capita and the
likelihood of sanction imposition, based on the results from
model 2 in table 3. However, wide confidence intervals for
the highest values of the state capacity measure mean that
our predictions are less precise in that range. In sum, three
out of four models yield robust empirical evidence that the
probability of sanction imposition initially increases as aThis content downloaded from 129.01
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms function of increasing target capacity but subsequently falls
as the target’s capacity reaches higher levels. These results
support the predictions of hypothesis 1: the United States is
less likely to impose sanctions in cases in which targets
exhibit very low state capacity and in cases in which targets
exhibit high state capacity. On the other hand, if targets are
in the intermediate range, the United States may be unable
to determine if they are hosts or sponsors. In these cases,
the theoretical model predicts that sanctions may occur in
mixed strategies. Our empirical tests demonstrate that the
probability of sanctions maximizes in this intermediate
category and hence support our expectation that the senderTable 3. Sanction Imposition by the United States against States Where Its Interests Have Been AttackedModel 1
GDPpcModel 2
ln(GDPpc)1.023.082 on August 23, 
and Conditions (http://wwModel 3
RPRw2017 04:09:42 AM
w.journals.uchicago.eduModel 4
RPReState capacity .18** 2.02** 9.03** 38.60**
(.06) (.54) (3.81) (12.10)State capacity squared 2.01** 2.10** 24.21** 219.03**
(.00) (.03) (1.78) (5.89)No. attacks against US 2.03 2.04 2.04 2.04
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)Transition to dictatorship 1.62** 1.62** 1.49** 1.45**
(.72) (.72) (.69) (.70)Polity .05** .05** .05** .04**
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)ln(population) .44** .58** .38** .38**
(.09) (.09) (.06) (.07)Intrastate war .49* .53* .28 .26
(.28) (.28) (.30) (.29)ln(US exports/GDP) .09 2.01 .01 .09
(.12) (.13) (.14) (.13)ln(US imports/GDP) 2.06 2.08 .06 2.00
(.09) (.07) (.10) (.10)UN voting affinity 2.21 .09 .01 .10
(.27) (.31) (.30) (.29)t (years without attack) 2.06 2.04 2.07 2.06
(.08) (.08) (.07) (.07)t 2 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)t3 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)Constant 210.01** 223.96** 212.24** 226.51**
(3.15) (4.37) (3.40) (6.72)Observations 2,570 2,570 2,829 2,829
Log likelihood 2476.64 2475.98 2509.84 2508.05
Wald test 128.86 167.33 155.80 140.39Note. Logit models; robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05./t-and-c).
262 / Sanctions and Terrorism Navin A. Bapat et al.should be more likely to impose sanctions in response to
the uncertainty about the target state’s actual relationship
with the terrorists.
CONCLUSION
The literature on counterterrorism suggests that states should
impose sanctions against known sponsors of terrorism but
should engage host states by expanding economic coopera-
tion. This study demonstrates that this strategy creates an
incentive for sponsors to misrepresent themselves as host
states. Since senders know that all states have incentives to
deny sponsoring terrorists but cannot perfectly observe if
supporting states are truly sponsors or hosts, governments
must use observable information to make inferences about
the relationship between foreign states and terrorists. We
argue that the key piece of information for senders is the
state’s capacity: governments can deduce that states withThis content downloaded from 129.01
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms very low levels of capacity are likely to be hosts, whereas
states with very high levels of capacity are likely to be spon-
sors. The key challenge for senders occurs when foreign
states have intermediate capacity, which results in an envi-
ronment of uncertainty about the foreign state’s true type.
During the “war on terror,” experts have often disagreed
about whether several intermediate states, such as Pakistan
and Yemen, are truly cooperative hosts versus active spon-
sors. This problem is exacerbated by sponsors’ incentives
to misrepresent themselves as hosts in order to support
terrorism successfully and avoid punishment. We demon-
strate formally that this incentive to misrepresent causes
governments to impose sanctions against states that exhibit
intermediate levels of capacity. Governments impose sanc-
tions as part of a mixed strategy when they are unable to as-
certain the true nature of the relationship between foreign
states and terrorist groups.Figure 3. Predicted effects of per capita GDP on sanction probability (models 1 and 2, table 3)Figure 4. Predicted effects of relative political reach on sanction probability (models 3 and 4, table 3)1.023.082 on August 23, 2017 04:09:42 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 263This study indicates that the most effective supporters of
terrorism are those that can most successfully imitate the
behavior of host states. Successful supporters may not ap-
pear outwardly hostile, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, but
should instead appear to be cooperative, such as Mushar-
raf ’s Pakistan. Second, the model demonstrates that sanc-
tions alone cannot compel sponsors to abandon terrorists,
nor can sanctions convince hosts to “do more” in under-
mining the group’s activities. Sanctions simply aim to un-
dermine the group’s ability to draw resources from foreign
states, which in turn harms the group’s ability to achieve its
objectives. This suggests that in terms of measuring whether
or not sanctions “work,” it is inappropriate to simply ex-
amine if a foreign supporter cuts off its terrorist group. In-
stead, our focus should be on the success of sanctions in un-
dermining terrorist campaigns and terrorist groups’ ability
to accomplish their strategic objectives.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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